

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 235

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Large-Scale Scientific or Technological Experiments with
Possible Adverse Environmental Effects

I have approved the following policy guides governing the conduct of large-scale scientific or technological experiments that might have significant or protracted effects on the physical or biological environment. Experiments which by their nature could result in domestic or foreign allegations that they might have such effects will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency feels confident that such allegations would in fact prove to be unfounded.

1. The head of any agency that proposes to undertake a large-scale scientific or technological experiment that might have significant or protracted effects on the physical or biological environment will call such proposals to the attention of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Notification of such experiments will be given sufficiently in advance that they may be modified, postponed, or cancelled, if such action is judged necessary in the national interest.

2. In support of proposals for such experiments, the sponsoring agency will prepare for the Special Assistant for Science and Technology a detailed evaluation of the importance of the particular experiment and the possible direct or indirect effects that might be associated with it.

3. The Special Assistant for Science and Technology will review the proposals and supporting materials presented by the sponsoring agency in order to assure that the need for the experiment has been properly weighed against possible adverse environmental effects.


4. On the basis of this review, the Special Assistant for Science and Technology will recommend to me what action should be taken on the proposed experiment. If the Special Assistant judges that inadequate information is available on which to make a judgment, he may request that additional studies be undertaken by the sponsoring agency or he may undertake an independent study of the problem.

5. Any experiment that may involve significant or protracted adverse effects will not be conducted without my prior approval.

6. In the case of experiments (such as atmospheric nuclear tests) that have major national security implications, the head of the sponsoring agency will notify the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as well as the Special Assistant for Science and Technology and will supply both with an evaluation of the importance of the particular experiment and the possible direct or indirect effects that might be associated with it. The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs will determine on an individual case basis the procedure to be followed in reviewing these experiments in order to assure that the need for the experiment has been properly weighed against possible adverse environmental effects.

7. To the extent that it is consistent with national security and subsequent to approval, there should be early and widespread dissemination of public information explaining experiments of this type.

8. While the final decision to conduct such experiments must continue to reside with the government, the National Academy of Sciences and where appropriate international scientific bodies or intergovernmental organizations may be consulted in the case of those experiments that might have adverse environmental effects beyond the U. S. Recommendation on the advisability of this course of action will be made by the Special Assistant for Science and Technology in consultation with the sponsoring agency and the State Department.



Info Copies to: The Director of Central Intelligence ✓
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency

122 11 1963
122 11 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CONFIDENTIAL

July 31, 1972

National Security Decision Memorandum 182

TO: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Continuing Authority to Deliver Nuclear
Materials and to Acquire Utilization Facilities


Pursuant to Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the President directs the Atomic Energy Commission:

a. To deliver special nuclear material to the Department of Defense in such quantities and at such times as necessary for cores for new military reactors and for replacement cores for existing military reactors, and for miscellaneous purposes (other than use in atomic weapons), for which material, fabrication, and new reactors the Congress shall have authorized funds.

b. To authorize the Department of Defense to manufacture, produce, or acquire utilization facilities for military purposes for which facilities the Congress shall have authorized funds.

The President grants the Atomic Energy Commission continuing authority to engage in the activities herein directed until such time as this authority may be amended or withdrawn.

The Atomic Energy Commission will report to the President at the end of each fiscal year the amount of special nuclear material that has been transferred and the utilization facilities acquired or operated during that year, along with the budgetary costs for these materials and reactor acquisitions.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of Defense

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/GDS

April 27, 1974

DDI-1311-74

National Security Decision Memorandum 254

TO: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Domestic Safeguards

The President has reviewed the report forwarded on February 15, 1974 on domestic safeguards, as directed by NSSM 120 and the subsequent memorandum of May 4, 1971 for the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

The President has noted the conclusions of the report, and particularly those regarding the needs (1) to weigh the possibilities of sabotage, plutonium contamination threats, and armed attacks (for example, by terrorists) along with the nuclear device threat, (2) to have a continuing process of threat assessment and establishment of appropriate countermeasures, and (3) to maintain fully adequate and essentially equivalent, in terms of quality and extent, safeguards systems in the licensed and license-exempt sectors.

Given the rapid growth of the nuclear power industry and especially the increased availability of plutonium, the President has directed that a priority effort be dedicated to ensuring the adequacy of safeguards systems and, in this regard, that:


- Foreseeable improvements both in material control and accounting procedures and in physical protection measures, as mentioned in the report, be implemented on a timely basis in order to provide an improved overall safeguards system.
- Full consideration be given the possibilities of utilizing specific measures now in effect for the license-exempt sector in the licensed sector.

In addition, the President has requested that the AEC, in coordination with other agencies as appropriate, submit an annual report on the effectiveness of the safeguards systems, program developments, and

SECRET/GDS

SECRET/GDS

related recommendations for his consideration. The first report should include, inter alia, an examination of the adequacy of present governmental procedures for responding to a diversion, theft, or sabotage attempt or for a known or suspected diversion. The review should be conducted in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (The question of U.S. consultations with other countries on safeguards problems is being addressed under the direction of NSDM 235.)

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. A. Kissinger", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET (XGDS)

July 22, 1974

DDI-24-74

National Security Decision Memorandum 261

TO:

The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Assistant to the President for International
Economic Policy

SUBJECT:

Nuclear Sales to the PRC

The President has reviewed the report of the Under Secretaries Committee of February 14, 1974 on Nuclear Sales to the People's Republic of China (PRC). He has approved the recommendations that:


- The PRC should be informed that we are prepared to negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy which would authorize the export of U.S. light-water reactors and slightly enriched uranium. The Agreement would call for the application of bilateral safeguard rights which would be suspended in favor of those administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if the PRC joins that organization. (The U.S. safeguards would again take effect should the PRC withdraw or IAEA safeguards cease to be effective.)
- The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and other interested Congressional committees should be informed of our offer to the PRC at such time as the Chinese express interest in negotiating an Agreement for Cooperation.
- Following Congressional notifications, interested U.S. companies should be authorized to proceed with discussions with the PRC on the possible sale of light-water reactors and slightly enriched uranium fuel.

SECRET (XGDS)

SECRET (XGDS)

2

-- Nuclear exports to Communist countries by the U.S. or other COCOM countries should continue to be treated on a case-by-case basis, and U.S. or IAEA safeguard standards and procedures for equipment or materials transferred or produced therefrom shall be applied to all recipient countries.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Counsellor to the President
for Economic Policy

SECRET (XGDS)

STAT

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>DDI (Attn: [redacted])</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>This package was sent to DDI.</i>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)